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President & Trustees of the College of the Holy Cross, 388 Mass. The plaintiff and the defendant were in a long-term committed relationship. [Note 7] While the record in this case may have permitted a fact finder to conclude that the defendant's conduct exposed the plaintiff to some risk of harm, the record does not depict conduct that can be fairly categorized as wanton or reckless. Early in the morning of September 24, 1994, they were engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. 152 , 156 (1940) (indifference to consequences distinguishes wanton or reckless behavior from negligence). Here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the defendant did not think about possible injury to the plaintiff when she changed her position.
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At some point, the defendant unilaterally decided to unlock her legs and place her feet on either side of the plaintiff's abdomen for the purpose of increasing her stimulation. Westwood Group, supra at 743, and is "to be determined by reference to existing social values and customs and appropriate social policy." Cremins v. Reasonable care is determined by the "standard of conduct demanded by the community for the protection of others against unreasonable risk." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 comment (c) (1965). The Supreme Judicial Court has held that, while reasonable care is the duty owed in most circumstances, there are exceptions to this general principle, although "only strong arguments of public policy should justify a judicially created immunity for tortfeasors and bar to recovery for injured victims." Lewis v. Clancy, supra at 292-293 (social host who has not provided liquor owes no duty of reasonable care to protect travelers on highway from intoxicated guest); Remy v. We conclude, therefore, that there was no legal duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff during their consensual sexual conduct. They express a difference in the degree of risk and in the voluntary taking of risk so marked, as compared with negligence, as to amount substantially and in the eyes of the law to a difference in kind." Commonwealth v.
When the defendant changed her position, she did not think about the possibility of injury to the plaintiff. The existence of such a duty is a question of law, Wallace v. However, "[i]t should be recognized that 'duty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection." Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 53, at 358-359 (5th ed. Here, the defendant can be found liable to the plaintiff for his injuries only if we determine that the defendant owed him a legal duty of reasonable care in the conduct of their consensual sexual relations. Mac Donald, supra at 677 (expectant mother has no duty of care to refrain from negligently injuring her unborn fetus). [Note 4] There are no comprehensive legal rules to regulate consensual sexual behavior, and there are Page 521 no commonly accepted customs or values that determine parameters for the intensely private and widely diverse forms of such behavior. at 678 ("No set of clear existing social values and customs exist, and no settled social policy can be identified, to justify the maintenance of the present lawsuit"); Conley v. [Note 6] While it is inappropriate and unworkable to hold consenting adults to a standard of reasonable care in the conduct of private consensual sexual behavior, we conclude that it is appropriate that they be held to a standard that requires them not to engage in wanton or reckless conduct toward each other during such Page 522 consensual sexual conduct.
Elections for the office of Montana State Senate took place in 2014.
A primary election took place on June 3, 2014, and a general election took place on November 4, 2014.
It is this variation that the plaintiff claims caused his injury. Addressing a like issue in a different context, the Supreme Judicial Court recognized that "in light of our own awareness that community values on the subject of permissible sexual conduct no longer are as monolithic" as prior precedent had suggested, it could no longer apply the statutory prohibition of G.
While the couple had practiced what the defendant described as "light bondage" during their intimate relations, there was no evidence of "light bondage" on this occasion.
The motion judge concluded that the ordinary negligence standard was inapplicable to personal injury resulting from consensual sexual intercourse and, applying a Page 517 heightened standard of recklessness, found that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment. The District Court judge also expressed the policy rationale that he was reluctant "to expand the reach of tort law further into the bedrooms of this Commonwealth" and that the Legislature, if it wished to create a cause of action for negligent sexual intercourse, could do so. 231, § 102C, and on November 13, 2001, the defendant moved the Superior Court for summary judgment and dismissal. The retransfer to the Superior Court subsequent to entry of summary judgment in District Court was proper.
The plaintiff's complaint sought recovery for serious physical injury suffered during consensual sexual intercourse with the defendant. The District Court judge concluded that the plaintiff's complaint was deficient in its failure to allege facts that could show that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care or that she had proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. [Note 3] The judge correctly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for improper retransfer, after determining that the District Court judge actually had entered summary judgment, although the latter had mislabeled his action a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
The plaintiff was lying on his back while the defendant was on top of him. Whether persons involved in consensual sexual relations owe each other a legal duty of reasonable care in the conduct of those relations is a question of first impression in Massachusetts. 244 , 245 (1982) (affirming traditional rule that landowner owes adult trespasser no duty of reasonable care); Gauvin v. at 454 (recklessness, not negligence, is standard upon which liability for injuries is determined between athletic participants); Wallace v. Since "[t]he essence of wanton or reckless conduct is intentional conduct . There is no evidence in this record to suggest that the defendant's conduct created a "high degree of likelihood that substantial harm [would] result to [the plaintiff]," which is required to prove wanton or reckless conduct.
The defendant's body was secured in this position by the interlocking of her legs and the plaintiff's legs. Generally, as the plaintiff claims, tort law requires that a duty of reasonable care be exercised to avoid injury to others. Pursuant to this rationale, Massachusetts has recognized a limited number of circumstances in which, while all other legal requirements of negligence are satisfied, the imposition of a duty has been determined to be inappropriate or unworkable. Wilson, supra (parent not responsible for injuries incurred by guest at underage drinking party, even though parent was aware of drinking); Cremins v. 799 , 801-803 (2004) (claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress and fraud unavailable because there was no legally defined duty or recognized standard of conduct between parties in a dating relationship). not merely rhetorical or vituperative expressions used instead of negligent or grossly negligent.
Mary Sheehy Moe is a former Democratic member of the Montana State Senate, representing District 12 from January 5, 2015, to January 25, 2017. Moe announced her intention to resign from her position effective in late January 2017.